General: Forums topic: Privacy & Security Apple Platform Security support document Developer > Security Enabling enhanced security for your app documentation article Creating enhanced security helper extensions documentation article Security Audit Thoughts forums post Cryptography: Forums tags: Security, Apple CryptoKit Security framework documentation Apple CryptoKit framework documentation Common Crypto man pages — For the full list of pages, run: % man -k 3cc For more information about man pages, see Reading UNIX Manual Pages. On Cryptographic Key Formats forums post SecItem attributes for keys forums post CryptoCompatibility sample code Keychain: Forums tags: Security Security > Keychain Items documentation TN3137 On Mac keychain APIs and implementations SecItem Fundamentals forums post SecItem Pitfalls and Best Practices forums post Investigating hard-to-reproduce keychain problems forums post App ID Prefix Change and Keychain Access forums post Smart cards and other secure tokens: Forums tag: CryptoTokenKit CryptoTokenKit framework documentation Mac-specific resources: Forums tags: Security Foundation, Security Interface Security Foundation framework documentation Security Interface framework documentation BSD Privilege Escalation on macOS Related: Networking Resources — This covers high-level network security, including HTTPS and TLS. Network Extension Resources — This covers low-level network security, including VPN and content filters. Code Signing Resources Notarisation Resources Trusted Execution Resources — This includes Gatekeeper. App Sandbox Resources Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com"

General: Forums topic: Privacy & Security Privacy Resources Security Resources Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com"

I've contacted Apple support about this topic, and they've directed me to this forum. I regularly perform Pentests of iOS applications. To properly assess the security of iOS apps, I must bypass given security precaution taken by our customers, such as certificate pinning. According to a number of blog articles, this appears to only be viable on jailbroken devices. If a target application requires a modern version of iOS, the security assessment can't be properly performed. As it should be in Apple's best interest, to offer secure applications on the App Store, what's the recommended approach to allow intrusive pentesting of iOS apps?

To use passkeys, you need to place the correct AASA file on the web server and add an entry in the Entitlements.plist, for example webcredentials:mydomain.com. This is clear so far, but I would like to ask if it's possible to set this webcredentials in a different way in the app? The reason for this is that we are developing a native app and our on-premise customers have their own web servers. We cannot know these domains in advance so creating a dedicated app for each customer is not option for us. Thank you for your help!

Our company has a micro service which sends a notification email to an iCloud account/email and the email is going to the junk folder. As we tested, the email generated from user-field.company.com goes to the Inbox, while the email from user-dev.company.com goes to the Junk folder. Is there a way to avoid sending the emails to client's Junk folder when the email is sent from a specific company domain?

We use Jamf Blueprint to deploy the managed app and identity to the iOS device (iOS 26.3 installed). Our managed app can access the identity via let identityProvider = ManagedAppIdentitiesProvider() let identity: SecIdentity do { identity = try await identityProvider.identity(withIdentifier: "myIdentity") } catch { } However, the app extension cannot access the same identity. Our app extension is notification extension that implemented UNNotificationServiceExtension APIs. We use above code in didReceive() function to access identity that always failed. The MDM configuration payload is: "AppConfig": { "Identities": [ { "Identifier": "myIdentity", "AssetReference": "$PAYLOAD_2" } ] }, "ExtensionConfigs": { "Identifier (com.example.myapp.extension)": { "Identities": [ { "Identifier": "myIdentity", "AssetReference": "$PAYLOAD_2" } ] } }, "ManifestURL": "https://example.net/manifest.plist", "InstallBehavior": { "Install": "Required" } } Is there any problem in our MDM configuration? Or the notification extension cannot integrate with ManagedApp FM?

My app Mocawave is a music player distributed through the Mac App Store. It declares specific audio document types (public.mp3, com.microsoft.waveform-audio, public.mpeg-4-audio, public.aac-audio) in its CFBundleDocumentTypes with a Viewer role. When a user sets Mocawave as the default app for audio files and double-clicks an MP3 downloaded from the internet (which has the com.apple.quarantine extended attribute), macOS displays the alert: "Apple could not verify [filename] is free of malware that may harm your Mac or compromise your privacy." This does not happen when: Opening the same file via NSOpenPanel from within the app Opening the same file with Apple's Music.app or QuickTime Player The app is: Distributed through the Mac App Store Sandboxed (com.apple.security.app-sandbox) Uses com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-write entitlement The file being opened is a regular audio file (MP3), not an executable. Since the app is sandboxed and distributed through the App Store, I expected it to have sufficient trust to open quarantined data files without triggering Gatekeeper warnings — similar to how Music.app and QuickTime handle them. Questions: Is there a specific entitlement or Info.plist configuration that allows a sandboxed Mac App Store app to open quarantined audio files without this alert? Is this expected behavior for third-party App Store apps, or could this indicate a misconfiguration on my end? Environment: macOS 15 (Sequoia), app built with Swift/SwiftUI, targeting macOS 13+.

I am not very well versed in this area, so I would appreciate some guidance on what should be enabled or disabled. My app is an AppKit app. I have read the documentation and watched the video, but I find it hard to understand. When I added the Enhanced Security capability in Xcode, the following options were enabled automatically: Memory Safety Enable Enhanced Security Typed Allocator Runtime Protections Enable Additional Runtime Platform Restrictions Authenticate Pointers Enable Read-only Platform Memory The following options were disabled by default: Memory Safety Enable Hardware Memory Tagging Memory Tag Pure Data Prevent Receiving Tagged Memory Enable Soft Mode for Memory Tagging Should I enable these options? Is there anything I should consider disabling?

While working with Platform SSO on macOS, I’m trying to better understand how the system handles cases where a user’s local account password becomes unsynchronized with their Identity Provider (IdP) password—for example, when the device is offline during a password change. My assumption is that macOS may store some form of persistent token during the Platform SSO user registration process (such as a certificate or similar credential), and that this token could allow the system to unlock the user’s login keychain even if the local password no longer matches the IdP password. I’m hoping to get clarification on the following: Does macOS actually use a persistent token to unlock the login keychain when the local account password is out of sync with the IdP password? If so, how is that mechanism designed to work? If such a capability exists, is it something developers can leverage to enable a true passwordless authentication experience at the login window and lock screen (i.e., avoiding the need for a local password fallback)? I’m trying to confirm what macOS officially supports so I can understand whether passwordless login is achievable using the persistent-token approach. Thanks in advance for any clarification.

I am trying to integrate those into my app, stuck on it would not transfer to view that inside app, can someone help? Scott

I'm building a macOS app that registers itself for HTTP(S) url handling and would like it to participate in the ASWebAuthenticationSession fow. I did: update the plist to register as a handler for URL shemes (http, https, file) use NSWorkspace setDefaultApplication API to set this app as a default handler for urls in question wrote custom ASWebAuthenticationSessionWebBrowserSessionHandling implementation and set it as SessionManager's sessionHandler I launched this app from Xcode, then I triggered authentication flow from a third-party app. When the sign in flow is initiated, I can see that my app is activeated (willBecomeActive and didBecomeActive callbacks are both called), but there is no call for sessionHandler's begin() method. With some additional debugging I see that my app receives an apple event when the flow is started: {sfri,auth target=SafariLaunchAgent {qntp=90/$627......},aapd=TRUE If I switch system default browser back to Safari and then start the login flow, it correctly displays a sign in web page. What do I miss? PS. I'm on Tahoe 26.2

[Q] When is the kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient set by macOS and in which conditions? From what I'm gathering, the kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient can not be set by a configuration profile and the end user can only grant full disk access. I searched for documentation on Apple's develop website (with the "kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient" search) and did not get any useful result. Using a more complete search engine, or the forum search engine, only points to the old annoying big bug in macOS Ventura. The problem I'm investigating is showing a process being listed as getting granted kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient permissions in the TCC database when: it's not an Endpoint Security client. it does not have the ES Client entitlement. the bundle of the process includes another process that is an ES Client and is spawn-ed by this process but I don't see why this should have an impact. This process is supposed to have been granted kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles via end user interaction or configuration profile. AFAIK, the kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient permission can only be set by macOS itself. So this looks like to be either a bug in macOS, an undocumented behavior or I'm missing something. Hence the initial question. macOS 15.7.3 / Apple Silicon

Hi, I’m seeing a production issue on iOS 26+ that only affects some users. symptoms: It does NOT happen for all users. It happens for a subset of users on iOS 26+. If we write a value to Keychain and read it immediately in the same session, it succeeds. However, after terminating the app and relaunching, the value appears to be gone: SecItemCopyMatching returns errSecItemNotFound (-25300). Repro (as observed on affected devices): Launch app (iOS 26+). Save PIN data to Keychain using SecItemAdd (GenericPassword). Immediately read it using SecItemCopyMatching -> success. Terminate the app (swipe up / kill). Relaunch the app and read again using the same service -> returns -25300. Expected: The Keychain item should persist across app relaunch and remain readable (while the device is unlocked). Actual: After app relaunch, SecItemCopyMatching returns errSecItemNotFound (-25300) as if the item does not exist. Implementation details (ObjC): We store a “PIN” item like this (simplified): addItem: kSecClass: kSecClassGenericPassword kSecAttrService: <FIXED_STRING> kSecValueData: kSecAttrAccessControl: SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags(..., kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly, 0, ...) readItem (SecItemCopyMatching): kSecClass: kSecClassGenericPassword kSecAttrService: <FIXED_STRING> kSecReturnData: YES (uses kSecUseOperationPrompt in our async method) Question: On iOS 26+, is there any known issue or new behavior where a successfully added GenericPassword item could later return errSecItemNotFound after app termination/relaunch for only some users/devices? What should we check to distinguish: OS behavior change/bug vs. entitlement/access-group differences (app vs extension, provisioning/team changes), device state/policies (MDM, passcode/biometrics changes), query attributes we should include to make the item stable across relaunch? Build / Dev Environment: macOS: 15.6.1 (24G90) Xcode: 26.2

Our Goal: We are implementing a workflow for derived credentials. Our objective is to have a PIV/CAC derived credential (from Entrust), installed via the Intune MDM Company Portal app, and then use it within our (managed) app to generate digital signatures. Challenge: The Intune Company Portal installs these identities into the System Keychain. Because third-party apps are restricted from accessing private keys in the System Keychain, we are running into a roadblock. Our Question: 1) Is there an API that allows us to create a signature without us having to pass the private key itself, but instead just pass a handle/some reference to the private key and then the API can access the private key in the system keychain and create the signature under the hood. SecKeyCreateSignature is the API method that creates a signature but requires passing a private key. 2) If #1 is not feasible, is there a way to get access to system keychain to retrieve certs + private key for managed apps

Apple has repeatedly ignored my reports about a critical privacy issue in Spotlight on macOS 26, and the problem persists in version 26.3 RC. This is not a minor glitch, it is a fundamental breach of user trust and privacy. Several aspects of Spotlight fail to respect user settings: • Hidden apps still exposed: In the Apps section (Cmd+1), Spotlight continues to display apps marked with the hidden flag, even though they should remain invisible. • Clipboard reactivation: The clipboard feature repeatedly turns itself back on after logout or restart, despite being explicitly disabled by the user. • Excluded files revealed: Most concerning, Spotlight exposes files in Suggestions and Recents (Cmd+3) even when those files are explicitly excluded under System Settings > Spotlight > Search Privacy. This behavior directly violates user expectations and system settings. It is not only a major privacy issue but also a security risk, since sensitive files can be surfaced without consent. Apple must address this immediately. Users rely on Spotlight to respect their privacy configurations, and the current behavior undermines both trust and security.

I have filed bug reports on this to no avail, so I am bringing it up here hoping someone at Apple will address this. Since the first beta of 26.3, with voice control enabled there are now two icons in the menu bar (*plus an orange dot in full screen) that never go away. That orange microphone isn't serving its intended purpose to notify me that something is accessing my microphone if it is always displayed. I use voice control extensively, so it is nearly always on. In every prior version of macOS, the orange icon was not on for voice control. Even if voice control is not listening but simply enabled in system settings, the orange icon will be there. And there is no need for this icon to be on for a system service that is always listening. This orange icon in the menu bar at all times is incredibly irritating, as it takes up valuable space to the right of the notch, and causes other actual useful menu bar items to be hidden. As well, if some other application on my system were to turn on the mic and start recording me I would never know since that orange icon is always on. It also places an orange dot next to the control center icon taking up even more of the precious little menu bar real estate. Please fix this! Either exempt voice control (as Siri is always listening and it doesn't get the orange icon) or exempt all system services, or give me a way to turn this off. If you cannot tell, I find this incredibly annoying and frustrating.

% curl -v https://app-site-association.cdn-apple.com/a/v1/zfcs.bankts.cn Host app-site-association.cdn-apple.com:443 was resolved. IPv6: (none) IPv4: 218.92.226.151, 119.101.148.193, 218.92.226.6, 115.152.217.3 Trying 218.92.226.151:443... Connected to app-site-association.cdn-apple.com (218.92.226.151) port 443 ALPN: curl offers h2,http/1.1 (304) (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1): CAfile: /etc/ssl/cert.pem CApath: none (304) (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2): (304) (IN), TLS handshake, Unknown (8): (304) (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11): (304) (IN), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15): (304) (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20): (304) (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20): SSL connection using TLSv1.3 / AEAD-AES256-GCM-SHA384 / [blank] / UNDEF ALPN: server accepted http/1.1 Server certificate: subject: C=US; ST=California; O=Apple Inc.; CN=app-site-association.cdn-apple.com start date: Sep 25 13:58:08 2025 GMT expire date: Mar 31 17:44:25 2026 GMT subjectAltName: host "app-site-association.cdn-apple.com" matched cert's "app-site-association.cdn-apple.com" issuer: CN=Apple Public Server RSA CA 11 - G1; O=Apple Inc.; ST=California; C=US SSL certificate verify ok. using HTTP/1.x GET /a/v1/zfcs.bankts.cn HTTP/1.1 Host: app-site-association.cdn-apple.com User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 Accept: / Request completely sent off < HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found < Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 < Content-Length: 10 < Connection: keep-alive < Server: nginx < Date: Wed, 04 Feb 2026 02:26:00 GMT < Expires: Wed, 04 Feb 2026 02:26:10 GMT < Age: 24 < Apple-Failure-Details: {"cause":"context deadline exceeded (Client.Timeout exceeded while awaiting headers)"} < Apple-Failure-Reason: SWCERR00301 Timeout < Apple-From: https://zfcs.bankts.cn/.well-known/apple-app-site-association < Apple-Try-Direct: true < Vary: Accept-Encoding < Via: https/1.1 jptyo12-3p-pst-003.ts.apple.com (acdn/3.16363), http/1.1 jptyo12-3p-pac-043.ts.apple.com (acdn/3.16363), https/1.1 jptyo12-3p-pfe-002.ts.apple.com (acdn/3.16363) < X-Cache: MISS KS-CLOUD < CDNUUID: 736dc646-57fb-43c9-aa0d-eedad3a534f8-1154605242 < x-link-via: yancmp83:443;xmmp02:443;fzct321:443; < x-b2f-cs-cache: no-cache < X-Cache-Status: MISS from KS-CLOUD-FZ-CT-321-35 < X-Cache-Status: MISS from KS-CLOUD-XM-MP-02-16 < X-Cache-Status: MISS from KS-CLOUD-YANC-MP-83-15 < X-KSC-Request-ID: c4a640c815640ee93c263a357ee919d6 < CDN-Server: KSFTF < X-Cdn-Request-ID: c4a640c815640ee93c263a357ee919d6 < Not Found Connection #0 to host app-site-association.cdn-apple.com left intact

I'm developing a passkey manager using ASCredentialProviderViewController. I've set a custom AAGUID in the attestation object during registration: let aaguid = Data([ 0xec, 0x78, 0xfa, 0xe8, 0xb2, 0xe0, 0x56, 0x97, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x28, 0xc3, 0x95, 0x00 ]) However, when I test on webauthn.io, the relying party receives: AAGUID: 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 Provider Name: "iCloud Keychain" It appears that macOS overwrites the AAGUID to all zeros for third-party Credential Provider Extensions. This makes it impossible for relying parties to distinguish between different passkey providers, which is one of the key purposes of AAGUID in the WebAuthn specification. Is this expected behavior? Is there a way for third-party Credential Provider Extensions to use their own registered AAGUID? Environment: macOS 26.2 Xcode 26.2

Feedback ticket ID: FB21797397 Summary When using posix_spawn() with posix_spawnattr_set_uid_np() to spawn a child process with a different UID, the eslogger incorrectly reports a setuid event as an event originating from the parent process instead of the child process. Steps to Reproduce Create a binary that do the following: Configure posix_spawnattr_t that set the process UIDs to some other user ID (I'll use 501 in this example). Uses posix_spawn() to spawn a child process Run eslogger with the event types setuid, fork, exec Execute the binary as root process using sudo or from root owned shell Terminate the launched eslogger Observe the process field in the setuid event Expected behavior The eslogger will report events indicating a process launch and uid changes so the child process is set to 501. i.e.: fork setuid - Done by child process exec Actual behavior The process field in the setuid event is reported as the parent process (that called posix_spawn) - indicating UID change to the parent process. Attachments I'm attaching source code for a small project with a 2 binaries: I'll add the source code for the project at the end of the file + attach filtered eslogger JSONs One that runs the descirbed posix_spawn flow One that produces the exact same sequence of events by doing different operation and reaching a different process state: Parent calls fork() Parent process calls setuid(501) Child process calls exec() Why this is problematic Both binaries in my attachment do different operations, achieving different process state (1 is parent with UID=0 and child with UID=501 while the other is parent UID=501 and child UID=0), but report the same sequence of events. Code #include <cstdio> #include <spawn.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <string.h> // environ contains the current environment variables extern char **environ; extern "C" { int posix_spawnattr_set_uid_np(posix_spawnattr_t *attr, uid_t uid); int posix_spawnattr_set_gid_np(posix_spawnattr_t *attr, gid_t gid); } int main() { pid_t pid; int status; posix_spawnattr_t attr; // 1. Define the executable path and arguments const char *path = "/bin/sleep"; char *const argv[] = {(char *)"sleep", (char *)"1", NULL}; // 2. Initialize spawn attributes if ((status = posix_spawnattr_init(&attr)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "posix_spawnattr_init: %s\n", strerror(status)); return EXIT_FAILURE; } // 3. Set the UID for the child process (e.g., UID 501) // Note: Parent must be root to change to a different user uid_t target_uid = 501; if ((status = posix_spawnattr_set_uid_np(&attr, target_uid)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "posix_spawnattr_set_uid_np: %s\n", strerror(status)); posix_spawnattr_destroy(&attr); return EXIT_FAILURE; } // 4. Spawn the process printf("Spawning /bin/sleep 1 as UID %d...\n", target_uid); status = posix_spawn(&pid, path, NULL, &attr, argv, environ); if (status == 0) { printf("Successfully spawned child with PID: %d\n", pid); // Wait for the child to finish (will take 63 seconds) if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != -1) { printf("Child process exited with status %d\n", WEXITSTATUS(status)); } else { perror("waitpid"); } } else { fprintf(stderr, "posix_spawn: %s\n", strerror(status)); } // 5. Clean up posix_spawnattr_destroy(&attr); return (status == 0) ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE; } #include <cstdio> #include <cstdlib> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <errno.h> #include <string.h> // This program demonstrates fork + setuid + exec behavior for ES framework bug report // 1. Parent forks // 2. Parent does setuid(501) // 3. Child waits with sleep syscall // 4. Child performs exec int main() { printf("Parent PID: %d, UID: %d, EUID: %d\n", getpid(), getuid(), geteuid()); pid_t pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { // Fork failed perror("fork"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } if (pid == 0) { // Child process printf("Child PID: %d, UID: %d, EUID: %d\n", getpid(), getuid(), geteuid()); // Child waits for a bit with sleep syscall printf("Child sleeping for 2 seconds...\n"); sleep(2); // Child performs exec printf("Child executing child_exec...\n"); // Get the path to child_exec (same directory as this executable) char *const argv[] = {(char *)"/bin/sleep", (char *)"2", NULL}; // Try to exec child_exec from current directory first execv("/bin/sleep", argv); // If exec fails perror("execv"); return EXIT_FAILURE; } else { // Parent process printf("Parent forked child with PID: %d\n", pid); // Parent does setuid(501) printf("Parent calling setuid(501)...\n"); if (setuid(501) != 0) { perror("setuid"); // Continue anyway to observe behavior } printf("Parent after setuid - UID: %d, EUID: %d\n", getuid(), geteuid()); // Wait for child to finish int status; if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != -1) { if (WIFEXITED(status)) { printf("Child exited with status %d\n", WEXITSTATUS(status)); } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { printf("Child killed by signal %d\n", WTERMSIG(status)); } } else { perror("waitpid"); } } return EXIT_SUCCESS; } posix_spawn.json fork_exec.json

We are using SecItemCopyMatching from LocalAuthentication to access the private key to sign a challenge in our native iOS app twice in a few seconds from user interactions. This was working as expected up until about a week ago where we started getting reports of it hanging on the biometrics screen (see screenshot below). From our investigation we've found the following: It impacts newer iPhones using iOS 26.1 and later. We have replicated on these devices: iPhone 17 Pro max iPhone 16 Pro iPhone 15 Pro max iPhone 15 Only reproducible if the app tries to access the private key twice in quick succession after granting access to face ID. Looks like a race condition between the biometrics permission prompt and Keychain private key access We were able to make it work by waiting 10 seconds between private key actions, but this is terrible UX. We tried adding adding retries over the span of 10 seconds which fixed it on some devices, but not all. We checked the release notes for iOS 26.1, but there is nothing related to this. Screenshot:

In these threads, it was clarified that Credential Provider Extensions must set both Backup Eligible (BE) and Backup State (BS) flags to 1 in authenticator data: https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/745605 https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/787629 However, I'm developing a passkey manager that intentionally stores credentials only on the local device. My implementation uses: kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly for keychain items kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave for private keys No iCloud sync or backup These credentials are, by definition, single-device credentials. According to the WebAuthn specification, they should be represented with BE=0, BS=0. Currently, I'm forced to set BE=1, BS=1 to make the extension work, which misrepresents the actual backup status to relying parties. This is problematic because: Servers using BE/BS flags for security policies will incorrectly classify these as synced passkeys Users who specifically want device-bound credentials for higher security cannot get accurate flag representation Request: Please allow Credential Provider Extensions to return credentials with BE=0, BS=0 for legitimate device-bound passkey implementations. Environment: macOS 26.2 (25C56), Xcode 26.2 (17C52)

Hi, I'm using webauthn.io to test my macOS Passkey application. When registering a passkey whichever value I set for User Verification, that's what I get when I check registrationRequest.userVerificationPreference on prepareInterface(forPasskeyRegistration registrationRequest: any ASCredentialRequest). However, when authenticating my passkey I can never get discouraged UV on prepareInterfaceToProvideCredential(for credentialRequest: any ASCredentialRequest). In the WWDC 2022 Meet Passkeys video, it is stated that Apple will always require UV when biometrics are available. I use a Macbook Pro with TouchID, but if I'm working with my lid closed, shouldn't I be able to get .discouraged?