m personal iPhone is managed by an Unauthorized and Unknown mdm management team, The profile isn’t showing up in VPN Settings and I can’t remove them from having Remote access and control over my Personal Device! I’ve SPENT MANY MONTHS TRYING TO GET SUPPORT VIA EMAILING APPLE DEVELOPER AND SPEAKING TO APPLE SUPPORT WHICH HAS BEEN EXTREMELY EXHAUSTING AND HUMILIATIN! I’ve resorted to contacting Internet crime websit, the federal trade commissio, Better business bureau and Consumer Affairs to file an online complaint against Apple for not complying with their Security and Privacy policy for consumers accounts! Because of this unauthorized and unknown mdm device management profile I don’t have COMPLETE CONTROL OVER MY OWN IPHONE! ! Unable to find a team with the given Team II 'L95TAW5KWP' to which you belong. Pleas Developer Program Support. https://developer.apple.com/support I contacted developer support via email and also tried calling but they don’t respond!

Hello world! First post here. Developing my first app. It primarily targets supervised and MDM managed devices. A few questions: For supervised devices, is serial number available? I want to get the number and use it for app auto activation Is MDM required for supervised devices? Or, as long as a device is enrolled through Apple Business Manager? Which capacity shall I request for the app? Thanks so much!

In iOS 26.1 beta 4, under MDM restrictions that disable the camera via a configuration profile, the Camera and FaceTime apps are hidden as expected. However, other third-party apps can still access and use the camera function normally. This is unreasonable.

Hi, I found In-App purchase feature is restricted even with User-based VPP. I understand Device-based VPP does not accept In-App purchase, however User-based VPP accept In-App purchase. (It works on iOS 15 device actually.) When I tried subscribe ChatGPT on iOS 26 device using User-based VPP, an error dialog is shown that explains In-App purchase is not allowed. sysdiagnose shows logs belog: 情報 2025-10-26 23:58:22.350841 -0700 storekitd [Client] (ChatGPT) Initializing client デフォルト 2025-10-26 23:58:22.353982 -0700 storekitd [Client] (ChatGPT) Initialized with server Production bundle ID com.openai.chat and request bundle ID com.openai.chat] デフォルト 2025-10-26 23:58:22.354020 -0700 storekitd [CanMakePayments] In-app purchase disabled because app com.openai.chat has MID based SINF In iOS 15 device, no storekitd logs are found and appstored and several processes seem to handle In-App purchase. Does In-App purchase no longer work with User-based VPP? Thank you.

We have applications RME and RMEUI, which are added under FileProviders section. Looking for MDM profile that can lock these entries so that users cannot disable them. Currently we are using JAMF Pro MDM to control our applications. In Sequoia OS -> Open System Preferences -> General -> Login Items & Extensions -> Under Extensions section -> File Providers In Tahoe OS -> Open System Preferences -> General -> Login Items & Extensions -> Under By Category/App section -> File Providers (In the screen shot you can find RME entry)

When an iOS 26.0 device is prepared in supervised mode, wifi connection screen is showing when the device is restarted. This wifi connect appears always on restart. I have tried using Apple Configurator GUI and Command line (cfgutil) command. In both cases, The behavior Wifi screen is showing up on restart for supervised mode. Cfgutil command: cfgutil -C {Certificate} -K {Key} prepare --supervised --name {NAME} --host-cert {Certificate} --skip-all Note: In non-supervised mode and other iOS, the wifi screen is not showing. Apple Configurator version: 2.18 iOS version: 26.0 Device model: iPhone 11 and above. Anyone else facing this issue? Any help is super appreciated.

When I try to sign in Managed Apple ID in supervised device there appears a prompt stating that "Apple ID" is a work account.This account must be signed in as a work account on this device.When I click continue it takes to VPN and device management tab where MDM profile already exists. Note:The managed Apple ID has a ICloud subscription for it. When I remove the subscription for the Apple ID and try to sign in, it works. Kindly help on this or advise on any additional steps required to enable sign in for managed Apple ID in this scenario

We are having issues working with bypass codes the server creates when initiating Activation Lock through MDM. We are able to use the device-generated bypass codes without issue. When using the end point to request activation lock as specified in https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicemanagement/creating-and-using-bypass-codes/ we get a 200 response. But when using the endpoint to bypass the activation lock, we get a 404 response. If we try to manually input the activation lock bypass code, it also does not work. Both of these methods work with the device-generated bypass codes. Just to clarify when testing the server generated codes, we ensured that we did not test the device-generated codes. All of this was tested on iOS devices. Created feedback ticket FB21365819 with device specific details.

Hey everyone, Is it possible and how to get Managed Apple ID (email) programmatically for user signed in to ipad through shared IPad feature ? It would be good to have MDM independent solution, I mean API call to MDM service is not acceptable for us. Maybe API call to ASM or ABM, or get that somehow on iOS device end... any advice ? Thanks in advance, Dima

Hello Apple Developer Community, I am implementing the "Return to Service" feature with app preservation in our MDM solution (iOS 26+). My goal is to use the EraseDeviceCommand to securely erase user data while preserving managed apps, and then have the device automatically re-enroll without user interaction. What I am doing: The device is supervised and successfully enrolled in Automated Device Enrollment (ADE). The device has generated and escrowed a bootstrap token to our MDM server (SetBootstrapToken received). I am sending the EraseDeviceCommand to the device via MDM with the necessary parameters for Return to Service with app preservation. The command payload includes: Enabled: true The previously escrowed BootstrapToken (as Base64 data). WiFiProfileData (as Base64 data) to ensure connectivity post-erase. Example Payload Structure (Simplified): <key>ReturnToService</key> <dict> <key>Enabled</key> <true/> <key>BootstrapToken</key> <data>YOUR_BASE64_TOKEN</data> <key>WiFiProfileData</key> <data>YOUR_BASE64_WIFI_PROFILE</data> </dict> The observed behavior: The erase command is successful. The device performs the secure user data erase. Crucially, the managed applications are preserved and automatically installed again after the reboot (confirming app preservation is working). The device connects to the Wi-Fi network successfully. The issue: I am not seeing the GetBootstrapToken request from the device hit our MDM server's check-in URL during the post-erase setup assistant phase. The re-enrollment seems to complete, but this specific request is missing from our server logs. My questions: Is the GetBootstrapToken request an explicit check-in message type, or is it an implicit part of the general CheckIn process during ADE re-enrollment when the token is used? If the device successfully re-enrolls and preserves apps, is the explicit GetBootstrapToken request still expected? Or does the token included in the EraseDeviceCommand payload satisfy all authentication needs for this workflow? What specific conditions or capabilities on the MDM server side might prevent the device from sending this specific request, even if the overall process succeeds? Any insights from Apple engineers or other developers who have successfully implemented this flow would be greatly appreciated. Thank you!

We have noticed that if we apply forceDelayedSoftwareUpdates in Restrictions profile, it causes ScheduleOSUpdates to fail or go into an invalid state. For example: On my iOS device, we have set the forceDelayedSoftwareUpdates to 90 days which removed the latest iOS update iOS 18.2 from the Software Updates section on the device. Post this, if I schedule an update for iOS 18.2 using ScheduleOSUpdateCommand, it fails to download. If I schedule the same without forceDelayedSoftwareUpdates, the update works as expected. Please help what could be the reason for this behavior as forceDelayedSoftwareUpdates should not block ScheduleOSUpdates.

Hi everyone, I submitted this feature request through Apple’s Feedback Assistant and wanted to share it here, because many families run into the same issue and Apple prioritizes features based on the number of reports they receive. Current limitation: Screen Time only allows one single Downtime period per day for child accounts. For families with separate school hours and bedtime, this is very impractical. My real-world use case: • Downtime 1: 08:00–13:00 (school) • Downtime 2: 20:00–06:00 (bedtime) Both serve completely different purposes, but are not possible to combine with the current system. My suggestions to Apple: Support multiple Downtime periods per day for child accounts. Allow custom exceptions per Downtime block (e.g., allow Phone app). Provide more flexibility overall for families using Screen Time. If you would benefit from this too, it would be great if you could submit the same request via the Feedback app – the more reports Apple receives, the higher the chance for implementation. My Feedback ID: FB21265678 Thank you! 🙏 Hallo zusammen, ich habe über die Feedback-App einen Vorschlag an Apple eingereicht und wollte ihn hier teilen, weil viele Familien dasselbe Problem haben und Apple mehr Rückmeldungen braucht, um das Thema zu priorisieren. Aktuelles Problem: In Bildschirmzeit kann für Kinder aktuell nur eine einzige Auszeit pro Tag eingerichtet werden. Für Familien mit getrennten Schul- und Schlafenszeiten ist das extrem unpraktisch. Mein Anwendungsfall: • Auszeit 1: 08:00–13:00 (Schule) • Auszeit 2: 20:00–06:00 (Schlafenszeit) Beides erfüllt unterschiedliche Zwecke, ist aber nicht kombinierbar. Mein Vorschlag an Apple: Mehrere Auszeiten pro Tag für Kinderaccounts. Pro Auszeit eigene Ausnahmen festlegen (z. B. Telefon erlauben). Allgemein mehr Flexibilität im Screen-Time-System für Familien. Wenn ihr das ebenfalls hilfreich findet, wäre es super, wenn ihr es auch über die Feedback-App meldet – je mehr, desto besser. Feedback-ID meines Vorschlags: FB21265678 Danke euch! 🙏

Hey folks, I work as a software development consultant. We develop enterprise applications for our clients, and the apps we create are usually for internal use. We've ran into a bit of a conundrum with a client who doesn't have their own Apple Enterprise account, and neither do we as we don't meet the criteria, but they're wanting to distribute an application we've built for them via their own MDM software. We are not entirely sure how to provide them with a distribution ready .ipa file that isn't AdHoc and will be recognized as a secure app. We've looked into generating a Developer ID provisioning profile and accompanying cert, however we're running into a problem where the platform of our app (iOS) doesn't match the platform required by the Developer ID profile (macOS). I've also come across the idea of resigning an .ipa, but again, the client doesn't have a Apple Developer account and expects the working .ipa to be included in the service rendered. Any suggestions or advice or documentation around the subject would be greatly appreciated. Thanks, Ale

I found a new Payload attribute LegacyAppConfigAssetReference in AppManaged introduced in iOs 18.4 beta. So I tried it, however no configuration is discoverted in the installed app. -- configuration { "Identifier": "8c2af0b6-5ae0-5927-a1cd-bab5e4148bb8", "Type": "com.apple.configuration.app.managed", "Payload": { "InstallBehavior": { "Install": "Required", "License": { "Assignment": "Device", "VPPType": "Device" } }, "AppStoreID": "535886823", "LegacyAppConfigAssetReference": "ac35558f-aefc-5faf-8f64-1faaff993b96" }, "ServerToken": "2abdc89492d89ca1a213ca61318ae0651c2b8de660c2847a44a3fb8ad9d9a8ad" } -- declaration/asset/ac35558f-aefc-5faf-8f64-1faaff993b96 { "Identifier": "ac35558f-aefc-5faf-8f64-1faaff993b96", "Type": "com.apple.asset.data", "Payload": { "Reference": { "DataURL": "https://i3-oreore-ios-mdm.azurewebsites.net/asset_files/eyJpZCI6IjNkOTg2YWVjNzQ1MWJiYWZlZjJmZGU1NmZmYmJlYjdkLnBsaXN0Iiwic3RvcmFnZSI6InN0b3JlIiwibWV0YWRhdGEiOnsiZmlsZW5hbWUiOiJFbmNvZGVkQ2hyb21lUG9saWN5RXhhbXBsZS5wbGlzdCIsInNpemUiOjMyMjUsIm1pbWVfdHlwZSI6ImFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL29jdGV0LXN0cmVhbSJ9fQ", "ContentType": "application/plist" } }, "ServerToken": "7433f7c0c991a1943636ff7bd8949e88738c684ecbde347ac8a9c5b5c19dda14" } -- And the data type of the managed app configuration is application/plist http https://i3-oreore-ios-mdm.azurewebsites.net/asset_files/eyJpZCI6IjNkOTg2YWVjNzQ1MWJiYWZlZjJmZGU1NmZmYmJlYjdkLnBsaXN0Iiwic3RvcmFnZSI6InN0b3JlIiwibWV0YWRhdGEiOnsiZmlsZW5hbWUiOiJFbmNvZGVkQ2hyb21lUG9saWN5RXhhbXBsZS5wbGlzdCIsInNpemUiOjMyMjUsIm1pbWVfdHlwZSI6ImFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL29jdGV0LXN0cmVhbSJ9fQ HTTP/1.1 200 OK Accept-Ranges: bytes Cache-Control: max-age=31536000 Content-Length: 3225 Content-Type: application/plist Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2025 22:59:40 GMT X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC '-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN' 'http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd'> <plist version="1.0"> <dict> <key>EncodedChromePolicy</key> <string>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</string> </dict> </plist> Please note that this example plist is the same content as is described here: https://www.chromium.org/administrators/ios-mdm-policy-format/ After applying the declaration, the app GoogleChrome is successfully installed but no managed app configuration seems applied. MDMAppManagement.plist in the sysdiagnose is like below: plutil -p logs/MCState/Shared/MDMAppManagement.plist { "metadataByBundleID" => { "com.google.chrome.ios" => { "Attributes" => { "Removable" => 0 } "flags" => 1 "source" => "Declarative Device Management" "state" => 7 } "com.microsoft.skype.teams" => { "Attributes" => { "Removable" => 0 } "flags" => 1 "source" => "Declarative Device Management" "state" => 7 } } } I also tried with our private apps and not applied... How can we use this feature or check the configuration is applied? Thank you,

Hello, I've noticed some unexpected behavior when updating a user's FileVault password. The set up: All actions are performed in virtualized macOS 14 and 15.5 guests on a 15.5 Apple Silicon host. FileVault is enabled. sjsp is a standard user with a Secure Token. The Mac is bound to AD, and the domain is reachable. Reproduction: systemctl -secureTokenStatus sjsp shows it's ENABLED. fdesetup remove -user sjsp fdesetup add -usertoadd sjsp systemctl -secureTokenStatus sjsp shows it's DISABLED. Surprisingly, sjsp is still able to unlock FileVault. Looking at unified logs for opendirectoryd and fdesetup, I see that a password change is being attempted in response to fdesetup add, which is unexpected. default 13:34:41.320883+0100 opendirectoryd Changing password for <private> (E5CC46D7-0C1F-4009-8421-9AA8217CB784) info 13:34:41.321317+0100 opendirectoryd No unlock record exists for E5CC46D7-0C1F-4009-8421-9AA8217CB784 info 13:34:41.321331+0100 opendirectoryd <private> (E5CC46D7-0C1F-4009-8421-9AA8217CB784) is not a SecureToken user: no unlock record default 13:34:41.321341+0100 opendirectoryd Changing password for <private> (E5CC46D7-0C1F-4009-8421-9AA8217CB784): user <private> SecureToken, only new password provided, credential <private> default 13:34:41.321454+0100 opendirectoryd Changing password for <private> (E5CC46D7-0C1F-4009-8421-9AA8217CB784) with no existing unlock record info 13:34:41.321857+0100 opendirectoryd No unlock record exists for E5CC46D7-0C1F-4009-8421-9AA8217CB784 default 13:34:41.321873+0100 opendirectoryd Record <private> (E5CC46D7-0C1F-4009-8421-9AA8217CB784) is eligible for SecureToken default 13:34:41.322637+0100 fdesetup DMAPFS cryptoUserForMacOSUserForVolume DMErr=-69594 retErr=-69594 outAPFSCryptoUser=(null) default 13:34:41.322699+0100 opendirectoryd While changing password for <private> (E5CC46D7-0C1F-4009-8421-9AA8217CB784): Not adding SecureToken; other unlock records exist, but no existing unlock record provided If I disconnect the network and follow the reproduction steps then the Secure Token is retained. Reconnecting and waiting a while doesn't cause the Secure Token to be lost. There are no log entries about attempting to change the password. Any help or explanation would be appreciated, thanks in advance.

Guideline 3.1.1 - Business - Payments - In-App Purchase The app includes an account registration feature for businesses and organizations, which is considered access to external mechanisms for purchases or subscriptions to be used in the app. Next Steps Remove the account registration features for business and organizations. Our application currently allows users to register and create multiple accounts using a phone number. All users can freely create an account. The app is designed to help users manage their own products, orders, and sales invoices. It is purely a sales management tool. We do not provide any external purchase links, external payment methods, or subscription mechanisms outside of Apple’s In-App Purchase system. However, our app was rejected under Guideline 3.1.1 with the explanation that the app includes “account registration for businesses or organizations,” which is considered access to external purchase mechanisms. We are confused about this interpretation. From our understanding: Any individual user can register. The registration process is only for authentication and data management. The app must include an account registration feature in order to function properly. There is no external purchasing mechanism involved in the registration process. Could someone please clarify: Why would allowing users (including small business owners) to register accounts be considered “access to external purchase mechanisms”? What specifically qualifies as “account registration for businesses or organizations” under Guideline 3.1.1? What changes would be required to comply with the guideline while still keeping mandatory account registration? We would greatly appreciate clarification so we can properly address the issue and ensure full compliance with App Store policies. Thank you.

We are currently working on a SCEP server implementation that operates in FIPS-approved mode. In this mode, RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption is disallowed due to compliance requirements, and only FIPS-approved padding schemes such as RSA-OAEP are permitted. However, we have observed that the SCEP client functionality on Apple devices currently does not support RSA-OAEP for CMS EnvelopedData decryption. This creates a challenge for us in ensuring FIPS compliance while maintaining compatibility with Apple devices during certificate enrollment through SCEP. We would appreciate your guidance on the following: Are there any alternative FIPS-approved encryption algorithms or configurations supported by Apple devices for SCEP CMS EnvelopedData decryption? Is there any plan or timeline for future support of RSA-OAEP on Apple platforms for this use case? Feedback raised along with sysdiagnose logs as well : FB17655410

Hello All, I come to ask a question that I haven't been able to find the docs. I continue to work on implementing declarative management and while working there is a question/concern I have. I have noticed that during some destructive testing, if the device is attempting to fetch a configuration and the server responds with a 503 (or any server related error) then the device will wipe all configurations and attempt to reapply them. Is there any way to prevent this by intercepting status codes or would the only real solution be to force down a temp/test config if the real config can't be fetched from the server?

We are upgrading macOS (minor versions and potentially major versions) using a scripted approach: Install the InstallAssistant package via installer Trigger OS install via startosinstall On MDM-managed assets, OS update policies appear to prohibit or interfere with the update flow. The update often fails with startosinstall reporting “Helper tool crashed…” during the “Preparing” phase. Steps to Reproduce On an MDM-enrolled Mac with OS update restriction/deferral policies applied, run: sudo /usr/sbin/installer -pkg /Path/To/InstallAssistant.pkg -target / && echo 'MACOS_PASSWORD' | /Applications/Install\ macOS\ Sonoma.app/Contents/Resources/startosinstall --agreetolicense --forcequitapps --stdinpass --user MACOS_USER Actual Result Package installation reports success, but startosinstall fails during preparation with: Standard Output installer: Package name is macOS15.7_SoftwareUpdate installer: Upgrading at base path / installer: The upgrade was successful. By using the agreetolicense option, you are agreeing that you have run this tool with the license only option and have read and agreed to the terms. If you do not agree, press CTRL-C and cancel this process immediately. Preparing to run macOS Installer... Preparing: 0.0% Preparing: 0.1% ... Preparing: 24.9% Standard Error Helper tool crashed... notes.log Install.log is also attached. Questions for Apple / Ask: We suspect this crash is caused by MDM OS update restrictions/policies. We need Apple’s recommended method to perform macOS updates (minor + major) when MDM is present, especially in environments where update deferrals/restrictions may be configured.

Background / Objective We are currently developing a solution to centrally manage Apple OS updates (major and minor) across managed macOS devices. Before implementing at scale, we need Apple’s guidance on supported and future-proof update mechanisms under MDM. Questions / Ask (Apple Guidance Requested) Apple recommended method What is Apple’s recommended approach to perform: Minor updates (e.g., macOS X.Y → X.Z) Major upgrades (e.g., Ventura → Sonoma) in an enterprise fleet? Support boundary Is macOS update management only supported via MDM (including any newer declarative workflows), or are local mechanisms (installer + command-line tooling) also considered supported for enterprise automation? Use of startosinstall Can we leverage the existing utility: /Applications/Install macOS .app/Contents/Resources/startosinstall for automated upgrades in enterprise environments? If yes, are there recommended flags/workflows Apple endorses for unattended or minimally interactive upgrades? Long-term support / stability Does startosinstall have any form of long-term support / stability guarantees across future macOS releases? Are there any known deprecations planned (or guidance that customers should transition to MDM/DDM workflows)? MDM interaction / interference When using startosinstall, can MDM policies (software update deferrals/restrictions, update enforcement, etc.) interfere with or block the upgrade? If interference is expected, what is the correct supported way to coordinate: MDM software update settings local startosinstall execution to avoid failures and ensure compliance? What We Need From Apple (Desired Outcome) A clear statement of recommended and supported update workflow(s) for enterprise managed macOS: for minor updates for major upgrades Guidance on whether startosinstall is acceptable for long-term automation, or whether we should only use MDM/DDM-driven workflows. Any best practices or reference documentation Apple recommends for implementing this safely and reliably.